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Fitch’s paradox and Labeled Natural 
Deduction System
Abstract. This paper introduces a relatively novel system of representing 
modal logic in a form of natural deduction. It then expands it to accommodate 
the epistemic operator and applies it to generate a more precise formulation 
of Fitch’s paradox of knowability. Finally, an illustration of the paradox’s 
pertinence to contemporary philosophical debate is laid out.
1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to provide the means for presenting Fitch’s paradox, 
a philosophical argument requiring multiple modalities, within a purely formal 
deduction system. A labeled natural deduction system for modal logic offered 
by David Basin, Sean Matthews and Luca Vigano, provides the basis which is 
then expanded to accommodate an epistemic operator “know.” An advantage of 
this system: anyone familiar with first-order natural deduction is provided with 
the means to formulate a useful and fruitful philosophical argument in a more 
precise manner at no added complexity.
The remainder of this section will lay out some desirable properties of any 
natural deduction system that we will naturally strive to meet in this paper. The 
second section introduces the labeled natural deduction system of Basin et al. 
and expands on it to allow us to formulate Fitch’s paradox. Note that, while the 
authors use the “Gentzen-style” form of representing natural deduction, due to 
the relative length of the argument and the number of assumptions needed, for 
ease of presentation, the form used here is the “Suppes–Lemmon style.” The 
third section presents Fitch’s paradox first in an informal, and then in a formal 
manner. Finally, the fourth section provides the summary.
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1.1 Natural deduction systems
Although natural deduction was first developed 1934, it is partially based on a 
proposal put forth in 1926 by Jan Lukasiewicz, who called for a system that can 
yield the same theorems as the axiomatic systems of the time, but which would 
follow more closely the actual practice of constructing a proof1. This system, 
reflecting the “natural” way humans reason, would follow where “arbitrary 
assumptions” lead and how long they stay in effect. This desirable property is 
something to keep in mind while presenting a natural deduction system.
In their widely used logic handbook Language, Proof and Logic Jon Barwise 
and John Etchemendy state that: “… [natural deduction] systems are intended 
to be models of the valid principles of reasoning used in informal proofs.”2 This 
is precisely the purpose of the natural deduction system they present.
2 LABELED NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM FOR MODAL LOGIC
This section introduces a labeled natural deduction system developed by Basin 
et al. Following the ideas of Dov Gabbay, this system provides a framework 
for capturing a large number of non-classical logics3. The focus here will be on 
modal logic. The peculiarity of the system is that it introduces a set of labels 
W, W = {x0, x1, … , xn, … ,y0, y1, … , yn, …}. These labels can be thought of 
as representing worlds in aKripke model. The language of the labeled natural 
deduction system (henceforth: LNDS) differs from the standard, and widely 
familiar, (propositional) modal logic language precisely with regard to W.
2.1 The language of LNDS
The language of LNDS comprises two types of formulas, labeled and relational 
well-formed formulas. The latter concern the relations of labels, and correspond 
to the properties of the accessibility relation R in a Kripke model, whereas the 
former are merely modal propositional wel formed formulas expanded with 
a label; we will define these first, and proceed from there. The (inductive) 
definition of a modal wff should be familiar:
1  (Pelletier, F., 2000).
2  (Barwise, J., Etchemendy, J., 2003).
3  (Basin & al. 1998).
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Definition 2.1: Modal wff
1 Propositional letters P, Q and R are well formed formulae (wff).
2 If P is a wff, then ¬ P is a wff.
3 If P is a wff and Q is a wff, then (P ∧ Q) is a wff.
4 If P is a wff and Q is a wff, then (P ∨ Q) is a wff.
5 If P is a wff and Q is a wff, then (P → Q) is a wf.f
6 If P is a wff Q is a wff, then ( P ↔ Q ) is a wff.
7 If P is a wff, then  P is a wff.
8 If P is a wff, then ◊ P is a wff.
9 Nothing else is a wff.
Now we have all the ingredients necessary to define a labeled well-formed 
formula:
Definition 2.2: Labeled well-formed formula (lwff)
Let P be a modal wff (Def. 2.1), let W be a set of labels 
W = {x0, x1, …, xn, … ,y0, y1, …, yn, …}, and let x be a member of such a set, x ∈ 
W . Then x:P is a lwff which can be understood as meaning “P is the case in (a 
possible world) x.”
As noted earlier, a relational wff is concerned with a relation of two labels:
Definition 2.3: Relational well formed formula (rwff)
Let x and y be members of a set of labels W (as above). Then xRy is a rwff which 
can be understood as “y is accessible to x.”
2.2 Rules of inference
In this section we will explore the rules of inference in LNDS. The rules of 
inference for truth-functional connectives should be readily recognizable to 
anyone familiar with natural deduction—the only novelty here being that each 
line is expanded with (one and the same) label. The rule for negation introduction 
deviates from this pattern, and will be discussed separately. Afterwards, rules of 
inference for modal operators will be covered, along with examples to illustrate 
them. The mode of presentation is “Suppes–Lemmon” style—the central 
column contains the enumerated steps of the proof, assumptions or derived 
formulas. The column on the right contains the “justification” of a step—a 
rule of inference used, or “P” if it is an assumption (“P*” denotes an additional 
assumption that needs to be discharged, and the column on the left contains a 
set of undischarged assumptions the step “relies” on (assumptions “rely” on 
themselves). In a general form laid out here, the letters m, n, i, j, … signify 
numbers, Greek letters Γ and Δ signify sets of assumptions, and letters A, B, … 
signify wffs.
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2.2.1 Truth-functional connectives
Below are the rules for conditional and conjunction, which behave in a familiar 
way, the only difference being that each wff is expanded into a labeled wff, using 
the same label in each instance.
→ Intro
{m} m x:A P*
. . .
Γ ∪ {m} i x:B
Γ j x: A → B → I: m,i
→ Elim
Γ m x: A → B
Δ i x:A
Γ ∪ Δ j x:B → E: m,i
∧ Intro
Γ m x:A
Δ i x:B
Γ ∪ Δ j x: A ∧ B
or ∧ I: m,i
Γ ∪ Δ j x: A ∧ B ∧ I: m,i
∧ Elim
Γ m x: A ∧ B
Γ i x:A ∧ E: m
or
Γ i x:B ∧ E: m
¬ Intro
{m} m x:A P*
. . .
Γ ∪ {m} i y:⊥
Γ j x: ¬A ¬ I: m,i
Or, alternatively
¬ Intro
{m} m x:¬A P*
. . .
Γ ∪ {m} i y:⊥
Γ j x:A ¬ I: m,i
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Note that not all the lines here contain the same label (the label used in the line 
(i) is “y”). An impossible result in one world (i.e. under one label) can “transfer” 
to another world—a fact that Basin et al. call a “global falsum.” This is elaborated 
in Section 2.4.
⊥ Intro
Γ m x:A
Δ i x: ¬A
Γ ∪ Δ j y:⊥ ⊥ I: m,i
⊥ Elim
Γ n x:⊥
Γ i x:A ⊥ E: n
2.2.2 Modal operators
The novelty of this approach consists in the introduction of natural deduction 
rules for the modal operators “” (“necessarily”) and “◊” (“possibly”). Note that 
these rules of inference are analogous to the rules for universal and existential 
quantifiers, respectively (with an “arbitrary label” replacing an “arbitrary 
name”). 
 Intro
{m} m xRy P*
. . .
Γ i y:A
Γ – {m} j x:  A  I: m,i
Note: y is a new label, such that x ≠ y, and not appearing in any of the suppositions 
in Γ, except perhaps {m}.
 Elim
Γ m x:  A
Δ i xRy
Γ ∪ Δ j y:A  E: m,i
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Example 2.1: See the Appendix.
◊ Intro
Γ m x:A
Δ i xRy
Γ ∪ Δ j x: ◊ A ◊ I: m,n
◊ Elim
Γ m x:A P*
{i} i xRy P*
{j} j x: ◊ A ◊ I: m,n
. . .
Δ ∪ {i} ∪ {j} k z:B
Γ ∪ Δ l z:B ◊ E: m,i,j,k
Note: y is a new label, such that y ≠ x and y ≠ z, which does not appear in any of 
the suppositions from Γ and Δ.
Example 2.2: See the Appendix.
2.3 Familiar axioms
As noted, it is expected of a natural deduction system that it provide the same 
results as an axiomatic theory. Therefore, what follows are proofs of two well-
known modal axioms—the rule of necessitation, which states that every theorem 
is necessary, and axiom K, which demonstrates how the necessity operator “” 
is distributed over conditionals.
Proof 2.1: Rule of Necessitation (RN)
Let x:A be a theorem, and x an arbitrary label. Proof for x:  A will proceed as 
follows:
{m} m xRy P*
the proof of a theorem where each 
occurrence of the label x is substituted
for the label y
{} n y:A from the preceding proof
{} j x:  A  I: m,n
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Proof 2.2: Axiom K
{1} 1 x:  (A → B) P*
{2} 2 x:  A P*
{3} 3 xRy P*
{1,3} 4 y: A → B  E: 1,3
{2,3} 5 y:A  E: 2,3
{1,2,3} 6 y:B → E: 4,5
{1,2} 7 x:  B  I: 3,6
{1} 8 x:  A →  B → I: 2,7
{} 9 x:  (A → B) → ( A →  B) → I: 1,8
2.4 Global falsum
One consequence of the negation introduction rule is the rule called “global 
falsum”: Γ ├x:⊥ ⇒ Γ ├x:⊥.
4
Proof 2.3: Global falsum (gf)
Suppose that (1) Γ ├ x:⊥. Then Γ, y:P ├ x:⊥ (adding a premise does not alter the 
validity of a valid argument). It follows by ¬ I that (2) Γ ├ y: ¬ P. But in the same 
way, from (1) we can derive Γ , y: ¬ P ├ x:⊥, and another application of ¬ I gives 
(3) Γ ├ y:P. Applying ⊥ I to (2) and (3) yields Γ ├ y:⊥.
Since x and y represent arbitrary labels, it is obvious that falsum can “travel” 
freely between labels. The reason for the inclusion of the rule global falsum is 
that it allows a desirable result—interchangeability of W and ¬ ◊ ¬.
Global falsum
Γ 1 x:⊥ gf:m
Γ 2 x:⊥
The following two proofs demonstrate how this inference rule allows for the 
derivation of that desirable result.
4  (Basin & al. 1998).
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Proof 2.4a
{1} 1 x:  A P
{2} 2 x: ◊ ¬ A P*
{3} 3 y: ¬ A P*
{4} 4 xRy P*
{1,4} 5 y:A  E: 1,4
{1,3,4} 6 y:⊥ ⊥ I: 3,5
{1,3,4} 7 x:⊥ gf: 5
{1,2} 8 x:⊥ ◊ E: 2,3,4,6
{1} 9 x: ¬ ◊ ¬ A ¬ I: 2,7
Proof 2.4b
{1} 1 x: ¬ ◊ ¬ A P
{2} 2 xRy P*
{3} 3 y: ¬ A P*
{2,3} 4 x: ◊ ¬ A ◊ I: 2,3
{1,2,3} 5 x:⊥ ⊥ I: 1,4
{1,2} 6 y:A ¬ I: 3,5
{1} 7 x:  A  I: 2,6
2.5 Relational rules
Relational rules have the general form t1Rs1 . . . tmRsm ├ t0Rs0, where t0,t1,…
,tm,s0,s1,…,sm are members of the set of labels W. Relational rules mirror properties 
of the accessibility relation, and allow us to derive the corresponding axioms. 
The only rule necessary for the construction of Fitch’s paradox is the relational 
rule of reflexivity, and it is therefore the only one presented here.
Reflexivity
M
{} I xRx Rrefl:
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Proof 2.5: axiom T
{1} 1 xRx Rrefl:
{2} 2 x:  A P*
{2} 3 x:A  E: 1,2
{} 4 x:  A → A → I: 2,3
It is clear how this is in keeping with the historical requirement posed for natural 
deduction—to yield the same results as an axiomatic theory.
3 FITCH’S PARADOX
Fitch’s paradox, also known as the paradox of knowability, first appeared 
in Fitch’s 1963 article “A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts.” There, the 
paradox appears in Theorem 5, which states:
If there is some true proposition which nobody knows (or has known or will 
know) to be true, then there is a true proposition which nobody can know 
to be true.5
However, an equivalent claim, which states that if all truths are knowable, then 
all truths are known, is usually considered when discussing the paradox:
∀p (p → ◊ Kp) ├ ∀p (p → Kp)
3.1 Informal proof of the paradox
The strength of the paradox derives from the fact that it rests on mostly 
unproblematic principles. They are:
(KIT): Kp ├ p,
which states that knowledge is factive, i.e. knowledge implies truth.
(K Dist): K (p ∧ q) ├ Kp ∧ Kq,
which states that knowledge is distributed over conjunction, i.e. knowledge of a 
conjunction implies knowledge of the conjuncts.
5  (Fitch, F., 1963).
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Furthermore, we must rely upon the rule of necessitation (RN)—all theorems 
are necessary. The fourth and final principle states that if p is necessarily false, 
it is impossible: 
(P4):  ¬ p ├ ¬ ◊ p
Proof 3.1: Fitch’s paradox6
Now, suppose that every truth is knowable: ∀p (p → ◊ K p). Suppose also that 
we are not omniscient, that there is a truth which is not known: ∃p (p ∧ ¬ K p). 
Let p be such a truth:
(1) p ∧ ¬ K p
Now, since every truth is knowable, so is (1):
(2) (p ∧ ¬ K p) → ◊ K (p ∧ ¬ K p)
Therefore, by modus ponens,
(3) ◊ K (p ∧ ¬ K p)
This, however, can be proven to be false. Let us suppose (for reductio ad 
absurdum):
(4) K (p ∧ ¬ K p)
It follows by K Dist that both conjuncts are known:
(5) K p ∧ K ¬ K p
And, applying KIT to the second conjunct, we get a contradiction:
(6) K p ∧ K p
That allows us to negate (4):
(7) ¬ K (p ∧ ¬ K p)
And, since (7) is a theorem, we can apply RN to get:
(8)  ¬ K (p ∧ ¬ K p)
Applying the fourth principle, P4, we get the opposite of (3):
(9) ¬ ◊ K (p ∧ ¬ K p)
6  (Brogaard, B., Salerno, S., 2008).
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Obviouslym this means there is no unknown truth
(10) ¬ ∃p (p ∧ ¬ K p)
Or, in other words, that all truths are known:
(11) ∀p (p → K p)
So, supposing that all truths are knowable leads us, very convincingly, to the 
conclusion that all truths are, in fact, known.
3.2 Formal proof of the paradox
Obviously, for the proof of the paradox to be constructed, we need to have rules 
for the operator K. These rules will mirror the inference rules for the necessity 
operator (using a separate accessibility relation, RE) and will allow us to derive 
all the principles needed in the informal proof.
K Intro
{m} m xREy P*
. . .
Γ ∪ {m} i y:p
Γ j x: K p K I: m,i
K Elim
Γ m x: K p
Δ i xREy
Γ ∪ Δ j y:p K E: m,i
Additionally, the relational rule of reflexivity for RE will be introduced. It insures 
the KIT principle in keeping with the proof of axiom T in Proof 2.5.
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Proof 3.2: K Dist
{1} 1 x: K (p ∧ q) P
{2} 2 xREy P*
{1,2} 3 y: p ∧ q KE: 1,2
{1,2} 4 y: p ∧ E: 3
{1} 5 x: K p K I: 2,4
{6} 6 xREz P*
{1,6} 7 z: p ∧ q KE: 1,6
{1,6} 8 z: q ∧ E: 7
{1} 9 x: K q KI: 6,8
{1} 10 x: K p ∧ K q ∧ I: 5,9
Proof 3.3: KIT
{1} 1 x: K p P
{} 2 xREx RE refl:
{1} 3 x: p KE: 1,2
Obviously, the remaining principles have already been proven—RN in the Proof 
2.1, and P4 in the Proof 2.4b, substituting ¬ p 
 
for A.
Proof 3.4: Fitch’s paradox in LNDS
The formal version of the proof starts out in the same way—assuming that p is an 
unknown truth (2), but that every truth is knowable, and thus p ∧ ¬ K p as well 
as (1). Again, this leads to the claim that it is possible to know that something 
is an unknown truth (3). We now set out to prove (in line 23) that this not the 
case. Note that for the sake of legibility, the words label and world are used 
interchangeably.
{1} 1 x: (p ∧ ¬ K p) → ◊ K (p ∧ ¬ K p) P
{2} 2 x: p ∧ ¬ K p P*
{1,2} 3 x: ◊ K (p ∧ ¬ K p) → E: 1,2
We assume that there is an accessible world y in which it is known that p is an 
unknown truth:
{4} 4 xRAy P*
{5} 5 y: K (p ∧ ¬ K p) P*
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However, in that case p ∧ ¬ K p holds in y, and therefore, ¬ Kp holds in y. These 
steps correspond to an application of principles K Dist and KIT.
{} 6 yREy RErefl:
{5} 7 y: p ∧ ¬ K p KE: 5,6
{5} 8 y: ¬ K p ∧ E: 7
At the same time, if p ∧ ¬ K p is known in y, then K p holds in y.
{9} 9 yREz P*
{5,9} 10 z: p ∧ ¬ K p KE: 5,9
{5,9} 11 z: p ∧ E: 10
{5} 12 z: K p KI: 9,11
Lines 8 and 12 are contradictory—they imply that something is an unknown 
truth can not be known.
{5} 13 y:⊥ ⊥ I: 8,12
{} 14 y: ¬ K (p ∧ ¬ K p) ¬ I: 5,13
Since y is an arbitrary world, it is necessarily unknowable that something is an 
unknown truth. This step corresponds to the line (8) of the informal proof.
{} 15 x:  ¬ K (p ∧ ¬ K p)  I: 4,14
Now we need to perform the transformation from line (9) of the informal proof. 
To do so, we will assume that the opposite holds:
{16} 16 x: ◊ K (p ∧ ¬ K p) P*
Of course, if K (p ∧ ¬ K p) is possible, then there is a world in which it is true:
{17} 17 y: K (p ∧ ¬ K p) P*
{18} 18 xRAy P*
But, even in that world, ¬ K (p ∧ ¬ K p) is true (since it is, according to line 15, 
necessary). This leads to a contradiction:
{18} 19 y: ¬ K (p ∧ ¬ K p)  E: 15,18
{17,18} 20 y:⊥ ⊥ I: 17,19
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That contradiction transfers back to the original world:
{17,18} 21 x:⊥ gf: 20
And so the assumption in line 16 proves, be false, as we had hoped.
{16} 22 x:⊥ ◊ E: 16,17,18,21
{} 23 x: ¬ ◊ K (p ∧ ¬ K p) ¬ I: 16,22
Finally, we have shown that there are no unknown truths:
{1,2} 24 x:⊥ ⊥ I: 3,23
{1} 25 x: ¬ (p ∧ ¬ K p) ¬ I: 2,24
Of course, since p is an arbitrary proposition, it can be shown that all truths are, 
in fact, known. This transformation is trivial:
{26} 26 x:p P*
{27} 27 x: ¬ K p P*
{26,27} 28 x: p ∧ ¬ K p ∧ I: 26,27
{1,16,27} 29 x:⊥ ⊥ I: 25,28
{1,26} 30 x: K p ¬ I: 27,29
{1} 31 x: p → K p → I: 26,30
We have thus arrived at the conclusion that if all truths can be known, than all 
truths are known—Fitch’s paradox of knowability.
3.3 Philosophical implications of the paradox—an illustration
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that Fitch’s paradox is not just 
of logical significance—it also makes a genuine and insightful philosophical 
contribution. 
Timothy Williamson uses Fitch’s paradox in his book Knowledge and its 
limits7 to demonstrate, predictably, what the limits of our knowledge are. Let us 
briefly examine how. Williamson labels the thesis that all truths are known as 
strong verificationism (SVER):
SVER: ∀p (p → K p)
7  (Williamson, T., 2000).
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This is, as Williamson puts it, an “insane sounding thesis” (p. 271).
 
The more 
plausible sounding thesis that all truths are knowable Williamson calls weak 
verificationism (WVER):
WVER: ∀p (p → ◊ K p)
Obviously, the stronger thesis implies the weaker one, since all that is known 
can be known. But in order to demonstrate some limits to our knowledge, 
Williamson uses Fitch’s paradox to demonstrate that the converse also holds—
WVER implies SWER. They are therefore equivalent, and any objection to the 
insane-sounding thesis will apply to the more plausible formulation as well.
4. SUMMARY
We put forth two desirable qualities of natural deduction systems at the 
beginning of this paper. The first—that it provide the same theorems as an 
axiomatic theory by way of making and following arbitrary assumptions—has 
clearly been met: we have derived all the axioms needed to prove one famous 
theorem. Regarding the second property, we have used the system to model the 
principles of reasoning present in the informal proof. So this was, in a manner 
of speaking, a textbook example of what natural deduction is supposed to do. 
Moreover, the formal principles come with no added complexity for someone 
familiar with first-order natural deduction, yet they are able to contribute to a 
fruitful philosophical debate. 
APPENDIX
Example 2.1
{1} 1 x:  (A ∧ B) P
{2} 2 xRy P*
{1,2} 3 y: A ∧ B  E: 1,2
{1,2} 4 y:A ∧ E: 3
{1} 5 x:  A  I: 2,4
{6} 6 xRz P*
{1,6} 7 z: A ∧ B  E: 1,6
{1,6} 8 z:B ∧ E: 7
{1} 9 x:   B  I: 6,8
{1} 10 x:  A ∧  B ∧ I: 5,9
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Example 2.2
{1} 1 x: ◊ (A ∧ B) P
{2} 2 y: A ∧ B P*
{3} 3 xRy P*
{2} 4 y:A ∧ E: 2
{2,3} 5 x: ◊ A ◊ I: 3,4
{1} 6 x: ◊ A ◊ E: 1,2,3,5
{7} 7 z: A ∧ B P*
{8} 8 xRz P*
{7} 9 z:B ∧ E: 7
{7,8} 10 x: ◊ B ◊ I: 8,9
{1} 11 x: ◊ B ◊ E: 1,7,8,10
{1} 12 x: ◊ A ∧ ◊ B ∧ I: 6,11
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